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Abstract 
We develop a model of how information flows 
into a market, and derive algorithms for au­
tomatically detecting and explaining relevant 
events. We analyze data from twenty-two 
"political stock markets" (i.e., betting mar­
kets on political outcomes) on the Iowa Elec­
tronic Market (IEM). We prove that, under 
certain efficiency assumptions, prices in such 
betting markets will on average approach the 
correct outcomes over time, and show that 
IEM data conforms closely to the theory. We 
present a simple model of a betting market 
where information is revealed over time, and 
show a qualitative correspondence between 
the model and real market data. We also 
present an algorithm for automatically de­
tecting significant events and generating se­
mantic explanations of their origin. The al­
gorithm operates by discovering significant 
changes in vocabulary on online news sources 
(using expected entropy loss) that align with 
major price spikes in related betting markets. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In markets where items sold have uncertain value, an 
equilibrium price can be viewed as a summary statis­
tic reflecting the knowledge of all market players about 
the item's value. In fact, under common efficiency as­
sumptions, price is a sufficient statistic for the value 
of an item, given all evidence known to all participants 
in the market. In this sense, markets are very effec­
tive mechanisms for aggregating information that is 
spread across a population, summarizing that informa­
tion concisely in the form of (often publicly available) 
prices. 
Gambles are particularly extreme examples of 
uncertain-value items.1 A gamble (also called a secu­
rity) pays an amount contingent on some future out­
come. For example, the gamble "$1 if it rains tomor­
row" pays $1 if it rains tomorrow, and $0 if it does not 
rain. If an agent purchases (one unit of) this gamble 
for $0.3, then the agent wins $1-$0.3=$0.7 if it rains, 
and loses the $0.3 otherwise. Tomorrow, the value 
of the gamble will be certain (exactly $1 or exactly 
$0). But the value of the gamble today depends on 
the probability of rain tomorrow. In fact, assuming 
the buyer is risk neutral, the value to the buyer is ex­
actly his or her subjective probability of rain, since the 
buyer's expected value is E($1 if RAIN] = Pr(RAIN)·$1 
+ Pr(NO-RA!N)·$0 = $Pr(RA!N). 
Most hypotheses about the efficiency of markets as­
sume that information is incorporated into market 
prices virtually instantaneously, as soon as it becomes 
available to any trader. Informally, the reasoning is 
that, if some trader has superior information that al­
lows him or her to obtain an expected profit at the cur­
rent price, then he or she will take advantage of the op­
portunity by appropriately buying or selling, thereby 
driving prices toward the correct value given the new 
information. 
In this paper, we develop a theory and model of in­
formation incorporation in markets, and compare our 
theoretical predictions with real data from twenty-two 
political "stock markets" (betting markets on politi­
cal elections) on the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM).2 
We present an application where markets can be used 
as detection devices for significant information events, 
and parallel text streams (e.g., newsgroups or news 
media) can be mined to give semantic explanations of 
the events. 
In Section 2, we give necessary background informa-
1 In fact, gambles are often set up purposely to maxi­
mize uncertainty (entropy), for example by setting lines in 
a sporting event to make the outcome a fifty-fifty proposi­
tion. 
2http://vvv.biz.uiova.edu/iem/ 
406 PENNOCK ET AL. UAI2002 
tion and introduce notation. In Section 3, we present 
results of a large-scale analysis of the IEM. In Sec­
tion 4, we prove that, under certain efficiency assump­
tions, and without an explicit model of evidence or 
information, the prices in betting markets will over 
time converge (in expectation) toward the eventual 
outcome. For example, the price of "$1 if RAIN" will 
tend to rise over time in worlds where RAIN is true, 
as compared to worlds where RAIN is false, accord­
ing to a very simple relationship that appears to hold 
on IEM. In Section 5, we give a model of information 
release and subsequent incorporation in a betting mar­
ket, and show a strong qualitative correspondence with 
IEM price dynamics. In Section 6, we present our algo­
rithm for detecting and explaining information events. 
The algorithm looks at changes in vocabulary before 
and after significant market swings by ranking words 
and phrases according to expected entropy loss. We 
show that in three cases, the algorithm gives appro­
priate and meaningful semantic explanations for large 
price changes. 
2 INFORMATION 
INCORPORATION IN BETTING 
MARKETS 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
It is clear that markets often react quickly to the re­
lease of new and relevant information. For example, on 
March 11, 2002, the stock of Cepheid rose 34% when 
the company announced it was developing biological 
hazard detection devices for mail systems. Perhaps 
the relationship between price and information is no 
more clear than in betting markets. The current price 
of a gamble is precisely related to the probabilities of 
the possible payoffs of the gamble, and any informa­
tion available that acts as evidence for the possible 
outcomes should affect the price appropriately accord­
ing to the rules of Bayesian updates. 
The economic theory of mtional expectations (RE) ac­
counts for information incorporation in markets. RE 
theory posits that prices reflect the sum total of all in­
formation available to all market participants (Gross­
man, 1981; Lucas, 1972). Even when some agents have 
exclusive access to inside information, prices equili­
brate exactly as if everyone had access to all informa­
tion. The procedural explanation is that prices reveal 
to the ignorant agents any initially private informa­
tion; that is, agents learn by observing prices. 
Plott et a!. (1997) investigate, in a laboratory set­
ting, whether parimutuel markets (the type employed 
at horse races) are able to aggregate information, as 
postulated by RE theory. In one set of experiments, 
each subject was given inside knowledge that a subset 
of horses would definitely not win. Although all sub­
jects were uncertain as to the outcome, their collective 
information was enough to identify the winning horse 
with certainty. Information aggregation did occur, and 
RE-based predictions fit the data welL 
Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988) and Forsythe and Lund­
holm (1990) conducted laboratory experiments to test 
the reasonableness of the RE assumption in the con­
text of a securities market (essentially a betting market 
as described in the introduction). In many cases, even 
when information was distributed asymmetrically ac­
cross participants (for example, certain traders were 
given "inside" knowledge or evidence pointing toward 
particular outcomes), the equilibrium reached reflected 
the combination of all information, as predicted by RE 
theory. 
Beyond the controlled setting of the laboratory, em­
piricists have analyzed the accuracy of implied prob­
ability assessments given by public markets. Per­
haps the most direct tests involve horse race betting 
markets. Several studies demonstrate that odds on 
horses correlate well with the actual frequencies of 
victory (Thaler & Ziemba, 1988). Other sports bet­
ting markets, like the National Basketball Association 
point spread market, provide very accurate forecasts 
of likely game outcomes (Gandar, Dare, Brown, & Zu­
ber, 1998). Financial options markets (in many ways 
equivalent to betting markets) yield accurate probabil­
ity distributions over the future prices of their under­
lying stocks (Sherrick, Garcia, & Tirupattur, 1996). 
The Iowa Electronic Market (IEM) supports trading 
in securities tied to the outcome of political and finan­
cial events. Their 1988 market, open only to Univer­
sity of Iowa students and employees, offered securities 
that paid off proportionally to the percentage of votes 
received by various candidates in that year's US Pres­
idential election. The final prices matched Bush's fi­
nal percent margin of victory more closely than any 
of the six major polls (Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, 
& Wright, 1992). Since opening to the public, subse­
quent US Presidential election markets have attracted 
wide participation and following. Other election mar­
kets have now opened in Canada3 and Austria. 4 
We use the logarithmic score to measure accuracy 
and information incorporation in IEM. The logarith­
mic score is a proper scoring rule (Winkler & Mur­
phy, 1968), and is an accepted method of evaluating 
probability assessments. When experts are rewarded 
according to a proper score, they can maximize their 
expected return by reporting their probabilities truth-
3http://esm.ubc.ca/ 
4http://ebweb.tuwien.ac.at/apsm/ 
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fully. Additionally, more accurate experts can ex­
pect to earn a higher average score than less compe­
tent experts. Suppose an expert reports probabilities 
p1,Ji2, . . .  , pk fork mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
alternatives. Let w; = 1 if and only if the ith event 
occurs, and w; = 0 otherwise. Then the expert's score 
for the current event is In ( I;�1 w;p;) . Higher scores 
indicate more accurate forecasts, with 0 the maximum 
and negative infinity the minimum. The "expert as­
sessments" given by the market are taken to be the 
(normalized) prices of the candidates. 
Note that under the logarithmic scoring rule, an ex­
pert's expected score equals the entropy of his or her 
probability distribution. Stated another way, the neg­
ative of the logarithmic score gives the amount that 
the expert is "surprised" by the actual outcome. So 
the logarithmic score applied to IEM is both a measure 
of forecast accuracy and an information-theoretic mea­
sure of the amount that the market is surprised when 
the winners of the elections are finally determined. 
2.2 NOTATION 
If the probability of event E is Pr(E), then the 
likelihood of event E is .C.(E) = Pr(E)/ Pr(E) and 
the log-likelihood of E is .C. .C.( E) = In .C.( E) = 
ln(Pr(E)/ Pr(E)). We denote a gamble paying off $1 
if and only if event E occurs as (E). Let the price 
of (E) at time t be Pt· In analogy to the defini­
tions of likelihood and log-likelihood, define the like­
lihood price as 4 = pt/(1 -Pt) and the log-likelihood 
price as llt = In 4 = lnpt/(1- Pt)- So, for example, 
Pr(llt = b[llt-l =a) denotes the probability that the 
log-likelihood price equals b at time t, given that the 
log-likelihood price equals a at time t - 1. Similarly, 
the probability that event E occurs given that the like­
lihood price at time t is a is written as Pr(E[4 = a), 
etc. 
3 EXAMINING THE IOWA 
ELECTRONIC MARKET 
We collected daily prices from twenty-two political 
election markets on IEM. Markets include the 2000 
US Presidential election, the 2000 NY Senate election, 
and other elections in the US and around the world. 
In the NY Senate election, for example, traders could 
buy or sell shares of "$1 if Giuliani wins" , "$1 if H. 
Clinton wins" , "$1 if Lazio wins" , "$1 if another re­
publican wins" , "$1 if another democrat wins" , and 
"$1 if an independent candidate wins" . On IEM, can­
didates can be sold by first buying the bundle of all 
candidates from the "bank" for $1 (the bank is guaran­
teed to exactly break even with this transaction), then 
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Figure 1: Average logarithmic score of twenty-two 
election markets on IEM. Higher (less negative) scores 
reflect increasing accuracy. 
selling particular candidates back on the open market. 
Figure 1 shows the average logarithmic score over time 
for all twenty-two markets. Time zero is aligned with 
the last trading day in every market (on or near the 
corresponding election day), and time -i corresponds 
with i days before the last trading day for every mar­
ket. The plot at point -i is an average over all markets 
that lasted at least i days (fewer and fewer markets 
are represented toward the left end of the graph). The 
logarithmic score trends upward over time, indicating 
that the market's probability assessments are improv­
ing over time. Put another way, prices tend to move 
in the direction of the winning candidate. Morover, 
the increase in logarithmic score is roughly linear over 
a large portion of the graph, with a rapid rise evident 
just before time zero. It is important to note that 
recognizing this trend is only possible after the elec­
tion outcomes are known, since the logarithmic score 
computation depends on the actual outcome. The fact 
that the logarthmic score increases over time does not 
mean that price movements are predictable before the 
election outcome is known (in fact, if the market is 
efficient, prices are not predictable). 
The increase in logarithmic score can be attributed 
to the incorporation of evidential information into the 
market as it becomes available to traders. The linear 
increase over much of the graph can be thought of as a 
manifestion of a roughly constant flow of information 
on average into the markets. We discuss interpreta­
tions of the increase in logarithmic score in terms of 
our theory and model in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. 
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4 THEORY OF INFORMATION 
INCORPORATION 
We first make some efficiency assumptions, then prove 
consequences for price dynamics in betting markets 
like IEM. We begin with a basic assumption about the 
accuracy of market prices as probability assessments. 
Assumption 1 (Forecast accuracy) Let Pt be the 
price of (E) at time t. Then 
Pr(E!Pt.Pt-1,Pt-2, · · · , po) = Pt· 
Assumption 1 says that the market price today is an 
accurate assessment of the probability of E, indepen­
dent of any past prices. To see why Assumption 1 is 
reasonable, imagine for a moment that a betting mar­
ket existed where Assumption 1 did not hold. Then a 
trader whose probability assessments are more accu­
rate than the market's could earn a consistent profit 
(in expectation). But that trader's actions would act 
precisely to "correct" the market assessment, driving 
prices so as to make Assumption 1 true. RE theory 
essentially assumes that no individual trader has more 
accurate probability assessments than the market. 
Theorem 1 Assumption 1 implies the following con­
sequences: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
E[pt!Pt-1 = a] = a, 
where E[·] is the expectation operator, not to be 
confused with the event E. That is, prior to know­
ing the outcome of E, the expected price at time 
t equals the price at time t - 1 {i.e., the a priori 
expected change in price is zero). 
Pr(llt =a+ EjE, llt-1 =a ) , - =e 
Pr(llt =a+ EjE, llt-1 =a) 
That is, the log-likelihood price is e' times as likely 
to go up by E in worlds where E is true as it is to 
go up by E in worlds where E is false. 
Pr(/11 =a+ EjE, llt-1 =a) = 
ea + 1 
--,-------:- Pr(llt =a+ E!llt-1 =a) 
ea + e ' 
That is, the log-likelihood price is ( ea + 1) / ( ea + 
e-') times as likely to go up from a to a + E in 
worlds where E is true as it is to go up from a to 
a + E in worlds where the state of E is unknown. 
E[p IE 
_ 
] -
Var(pt!Pt-1 =a) t , Pt-1 -a a+--=-.;_:::_'----'----'­
a 
That is, the expected price at time t in worlds 
where E is true is greater than the price at time 
t - 1 by an amount proportional to the variance 
of price. 
Proof. We begin by proving item #1. By Assump­
tion 1 and Bayes' rule, 
D 
a Pr(E!Pt-1 =a) 
= fo1 Pr(EJpt,Pt-1 =a) Pr(pt!Pt-1 = a)dPt 
fo1 Pt Pr(pt!Pt-1 = a)dPt 
= E[pt!Pt-1 = a] 
Next we prove item #2. Applying Bayes' rule using 
log-likelihood notation, we get: 
.C.C(Elllt =a+ E, llt-1 =a) = 
In 
Pr(llt =a+ EjE, llt-l =a) + .C.C(Elllt_1 =a) 
Pr(llt =a+ EjE, llt-1 =a) 
Applying Assumption 1, we get: 
D 
l 
Pr(llt =a+ EjE, llt-1 =a) 
a+E= n +a 
Pr(llt =a+ EjE, llt-l =a) 
Pr(llt =a+ EjE, llt-1 =a) = ea+•-a = e' 
Pr(llt =a+ EjE, llt-1 =a) 
Next we prove item #3. Summing over possible worlds 
(E and E), we get: 
Pr(llt =a+ E!llt-1 =a) = 
Pr(/11 =a+ EjE, llt-1 =a) Pr(EJilt-1 =a)+ 
Pr(llt =a+ EjE, llt-1 =a) Pr(EJllt-1 =a) 
Applying Assumption 1, we get: 
Pr(llt = a+Elllt-1 =a)= 
ea 
Pr(llt =a+ EjE, llt-1 = a)-1 a 
+ 
+e 
- 1 
Pr(/11 = a+ EjE, llt-1 = a) -1-­+ea 
Dividing both sides by Pr(llt = a+EJE, llt-1 =a) and 
substituting in the relation from item #2, we get: 
Pr(llt =a+ E!llt-1 =a) ea e-• 
,...-�--'--- :-::':--7.--=-- '--:-=--+-­Pr(llt =a+ EjE, llt-1 =a) 1 + ea 1 + ea 
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D 
Finally, we prove item #4. We make use of a version of 
item #3 stated in terms of ordinary prices (as opposed 
to log-likelihood prices): 
b Pr(pt = biE,Pt-! = a) = - Pr(pt = biPt-! =a) a 
Using this equation and the definition of expectation, 
we can show that: 
E[ptiE,Pt-! =a] = 11 Pt Pr(PtiE,Pt-! = a)dpt 
= 11 Pt · Pt Pr(ptiPt-! = a)dPt o a 
�
 11 p� Pr(ptiPt-! = a)dpt a o 
1 2 -E[ptiPt-! = a]. a 
From the definition of variance and the result of item 
#1, we know that: 
Var(ptiPt-1 = a) = E[p�IPt-! =a] -E[ptiPt-! = a]2 
= E[p�IPt-! =a] -a2• 
Putting the last two equations together, we have the 
desired result: 
0 
E[p IE l Var(ptiPt-1 = a) t ,Pt-! =a = +a a 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of changes in log­
likelihood (t = lit -lit-!) measured across all twenty­
two IEM markets.5 The distribution is nearly symmet­
ric (a positive increase in log-likelihood oft is almost 
exactly as likely as a decrease of t), consistent with 
item #1 of Theorem 1. The plot of Figure 2 aligns 
almost exactly with the mirror plot of the distribution 
of -£ = lit-! -lit. In fact symmetry is a stronger 
condition than is provable from Assumption 1 alone; 
symmetry implies zero expected change (item # 1 of 
Theorem 1) , but not vice versa. Interestingly, the dis­
tribution of t follows a power law over several orders 
of magnitude. Future work may investigate whether 
other natural efficiency assumptions can explain the 
symmetric and power-law behavior of observed distri­
butions. 
Figure 3 shows the frequency of changes of t for candi­
dates that eventually won divided by the frequency of 
changes oft for candidates that eventually lost, over a 
range oft. The solid line plots e' as predicted by item 
#2 of Theorem 1; the fit is reasonably close. 
5The distribution density is estimated by measuring the 
cumulative distribution, then approximating the derivative 
at the ith largest e by (y;-so-YHso)/(x;_50-xHso), where 
X; is the value of the ith largest e and y; is the cumulative 
distribution at that point. 
100 
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Figure 2: Distribution of changes t in log-likelihood 
price measured over twenty-two election markets on 
IEM. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of changes t in log-likelihood 
price for winning candidates divided by changes t for 
losing candidates, on a linear-log scale. The line corre­
sponds to e', the theoretically predicted relationship. 
410 PENNOCK ET AL. UAI2002 
The fact that the logarithmic score tends to increase 
over time as seen in Figure 1 can be explained using 
items #2, #3, and #4 of Theorem 1. According to the 
definition of logarithmic score, the figure shows the 
average of the logarithm of the price of the winning 
candidates. Items #2 and #3 state that the prices of 
the winning candidates should go up faster on average 
than the prices of losing candidates, or the prices of 
all candidates taken together (assuming that there is 
at least some variation in prices). Item #4 describes 
the nature of the expected increase most directly. The 
expected increase in price from one time step to the 
next (in worlds where E is true) is equal to the variance 
in price at that time divided by the price. As long as 
the variance of price is nonzero (i.e., as long as prices 
have some probability of changing), then there will be 
an expected increase in price as time moves forward. 
The following corollary (the proof is immediate from 
item #4 of Theorem 1) establishes that prices provably 
trend toward the correct outcome over time. 
Corollary 1 Assuming some positive variance of fu­
ture price Pt given the current price Pt-l = a {that is, 
Var(pt!Pt-1 =a)> 0}, then: 
E[pt!E,Pt-1 =a]> a. 
That is, the expected future price is greater than the 
current price in worlds where E is true. 
Item #3 of Theorem 1 can also be used to obtain more 
specific results regarding the average logarithmic score, 
if more information is known about the apriori distri­
bution of E, for example, if we know that the distribu­
tion is a power law. 
5 MODEL OF INFORMATION 
INCORPORATION 
The previous section showed that several properties of 
the dynamics of betting markets can be explained with 
very simple assumptions. The increase in logarithmic 
score observed on IEM is implied once we assume ac­
curacy and variability of prices; no notion of evidence 
or information is explicitly needed. In this section, we 
seek to model information directly, and examine the 
resulting effect on price dynamics. 
We model the event E as the occurrence of ln/21 or 
more tails in a series of n fair coin flips. We model the 
release of information as the revelation of the outcomes 
of one of more coin flips. At time t = 0, the process 
begins with some apriori knowledge: i0 tails have oc­
curred out of ko trials. From that point on-from time 
t = 1 to time t = n -k-one coin is revealed per time 
step. At any given time t, it tails have occurred out 
of kt trials in total (including the initial i0 out of k0). 
-0.2 
� 0 -0.4 u � 
-� E 
£ -0.6 
·� C) .Q 
w ·0.8 C) 
� w > "' 
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Figure 4: Average logarithmic score of twenty-two sim­
ulated markets using the coin flip model. 
In order for E to occur, I n/21 -it more tails need to 
occur in the remaining n - kt trials. So at time t, the 
probability of the event E occurring is: 
( 1) n-k, n-k, ( n _ k ) Pr(Eiit,kt) = 2 
. L . j t J=fn/21-•• (1) 
We again make Assumption 1 that Pt = Pr(Eiit . kt), 
or, as in RE theory, all information known at time 
t is incorporated into the price at time t. Figure 4 
shows the average logarithmic score computed over 
twenty-two "markets" simulated according to (1) with 
io = ko = 0 and n = 1200. The figure show the price 
at every other time step; this corresponds to two coin 
flips per day when comparing with the IEM graph of 
Figure 1. We see a similar qualitative pattern of vari­
ability, roughly linear increase over a large period of 
time, and rapid increase near the end. This suggests 
that the dynamics of prices on IEM can be rationalized 
as resulting from a process where information is incor­
porated at roughly a constant rate on average across 
all markets. There are also discernible differences be­
tween Figures 1 and 4: for example, the variability of 
IEM prices appears greater than in the model. 
6 DETECTING AND EXPLAINING 
INFORMATION EVENTS 
Previous sections characterized the process of infor­
mation incorporation in betting markets. In this sec­
tion, we examine the possibility of using markets to 
detect significant information events and explain them 
using alternate textual sources. As a proof of concept, 
we present a semi-automatic procedure (which we be­
lieve is fully automatable) for monitoring markets and 
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extracting explanations from newsgroups and official 
news outlets. We present results from three markets: 
two from !EM and one from the Foresight Exchange, 6 
a market game that operates like a betting market 
(much like !EM), except that all transactions are us­
ing play money. Our previous studies show that play­
money market games behave in many ways like real 
markets (Pennock, Lawrence, Giles, & Nielsen, 2001a; 
Pennock, Lawrence, Nielsen, & Giles, 2001b). 
The three markets examined were: (1) candidate Giu­
liani in the 2000 US NY Senate election, (2) candi­
date Gore in the 2000 US Presidential election, and (3) 
the outcome "extraterrestrial life discovered by 2050" 
(XLif) as defined on the Foresight Exchange.7 Note 
that in market (2), the winning bet was defined as the 
candidate with the largest share of the popular vote, 
not the winner of the electoral college, so Gore was the 
eventual winning bet. 
We characterized daily price fluctuations in the three 
markets using the difference between log-likelihood 
prices from one day to the next. We identified days 
on which exceptionally large differences were observed. 
We found the following dates to be pivotal dates, im­
mediately following huge price swings: 
1. April 27, 2000 and May 19, 2000 for candidate 
Giuliani in NY Senate market 
2. November 08, 2000 for candidate Gore in the US 
Presidential market 
3. August 06, 1996 for XLif on the Foresight Ex­
change 
Figures 5, 6, and 7 show the price graphs for the 
three markets surrounding these dates. We used each 
of the dates as a splitting point for generating two 
text corpuses: a negative set of documents from before 
the date in question, and a positive set of documents 
from the week following the date in question. Doc­
uments were gathered from Usenet news archives on 
Google8 for all three markets. We gathered all post­
ings during relevant date ranges to the newsgroups 
ny.politics (622 postings), us.politics (480 postings), 
and sci.space.news (127 postings) for the three mar­
kets, respectively. We did not use any keywords to 
narrow the search further. Additionally, we gathered 
the titles and abstracts of articles in the Washington 
Post containing "Giuliani" for the NY Senate market 
(189 articles). 
We identify the features (words and up to three-word 
phrases) that differentiate the positive and negative 
6http://vvv.ideosphere.com/ 
7http://vvv.ideosphere.com/fx-bin/Claim?claim=XLif 
8http://groups.google.com/ 
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Figure 5: Portion of the price time series for candidate 
Giuliani in NY Senate election market on IEM, with 
significant dates highlighted. 
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Figure 6: Portion of the price time series for candidate 
Gore in US Presidential election market on IEM. Note 
that in this market a bet for Gore won if Gore had a 
larger share of the popular vote. 
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Figure 7: Portion of the price time series for "100 cents 
if extra-terrestrial life discovered by 2050" on the Fore­
sight Exchange. 
document sets using expected entropy loss (Glover, 
Flake, Lawrence, Birmingham, Kruger, Giles, & Pen­
nock, 2001). We do not explicitly remove stop 
words. Instead, we remove all features that occur 
in less than 7.5% of the positive documents, we re­
move all dates and numbers, and we manually re­
move source-specific words (e.g., "google" and "Wash­
ington Post" ). We then rank keywords by expected 
entropy loss as follows. Entropy is computed in­
dependently for each feature. Let P be the event 
that a document is in the positive set. Let f de­
note the event that the document contains the spec­
ified feature (e.g., contains the word "meteorite" ). 
The prior entropy of the class distribution is e = 
-Pr(P) lgPr(P)- Pr(P) lgPr(P). The posterior en­
tropy of the class when the feature is present is 
e1 = -Pr(Pif) lgPr(Pif)- Pr(Pif) lgPr(Pjf); like­
wise, the posterior entropy of the class when the 
feature is absent is ef = -Pr(Pi/) lgPr(Pi/)­
Pr(Pif) lg Pr(PI/). Thus, the expected posterior en­
tropy is e 1 Pr(f) + e f Pr(f), and the expected entropy 
loss is e - { e 1 Pr(f) + e f Pr(f)) . If any of the prob­
abilities are zero, we use a fixed value instead of 0 in 
the equations. Expected entropy loss is synonymous 
with expected information gain, and is always nonneg­
ative. Features are sorted by expected entropy loss to 
provide an approximation of the usefulness of the in­
dividual feature. This approach will correctly assign 
low scores to features that, although common in both 
sets, are unlikely to be useful for a binary classifier. 
Results are shown in the Tables 1, 2, and 3. The pro­
cedure did extract many words and phrases which are 
closely associated with real incidents happening dur­
ing the identified dates with major implications for the 
source/date top ranked features 
Usenet cancer, cancer news-
ny.politics groups,prostate, prostate cancer, 
Apr 27, 2000 cancer newsgroups ny, commies 
subject liberal, subject liberal 
propaganda, damnliberals liberals, 
has prostate, commies 
Washington cancer, from prostate, is suffering 
Post from, business of politics, diagnosis, 
Apr 27, 2000 suffering from prostate, prostate 
cancer, suffering, from prostate 
cancer, cancer diagnosis 
Usenet lazio, rick lazio, mayor, voted, rick, 
ny. politics rep rick lazio, alt fan rush, differ-
May 19, 2000 ence, ca politics, families 
Washington lazio, rick lazio, rick, rep rick, 
Post rep rick lazio, convinced, opponent, 
May 19, 2000 rudy, abortion rights, giuliani's in-
ner 
Table 1: Top features found for dates corresponding 
to major price changes in the NY Senate market. 
corresponding market bets. For example, April 27, 
2000 is the day Giuliani announced he had prostate 
cancer. Entropy loss extracted terms and phrases 
like "cancer" , "prostate" , "prostate cancer" from both 
Usenet newsgroups and the Washington Post articles. 
May 19, 2000 is around the time Giuliani formally an­
nounced he was quitting the Senate race, with Rick 
Lazio the replacement Republican candidate. Again 
reasonable explanatory terms and phrases were dis­
covered using our algorithm. Both the Usenet results 
("lazio", "rick lazio" , "mayor" , "voted" ) and Wash­
ington Post results ( "lazio" , "rick lazio" , "rick" , "rep 
rick", "rep rick lazio" ) indicate the name of Lazio as 
a top ranked feature. Words like "drop" , "dropped" , 
"quit" , and "bow out" did appear in the positive doc­
uments, but were removed during thresholding. We 
believe that more intelligent use of stemming and syn­
onyms would help in this situation where there are 
many ways to say the same thing (as opposed to the 
case of "prostate cancer" , where there is essentially 
only one way to say it). 
In the US Presidential election, the price of candidate 
Gore skyrocketed after the election when it became 
clear he won the popular vote. The near tie and result­
ing chaos in counting the ballots in Florida appear in 
our extracted keyword list, where the top ranked fea­
tures are "florida" , "ballots" , "recount" , "palm beach" 
etc. 
On August 6, 1996, NASA announced it had discov­
ered possible signs of life on a Martian meteorite. The 
price of a bet on XLif on the Foresight Exchange rose 
quickly, apparently in response. Indeed our algorithm 
found very relevant explanatory features, as listed in 
Table 3. 
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sourcejdate top ranked features 
Usenet florida, ballots, recount, palm 
us. politics beach, ballot, beach county, palm 
Nov 08, 2000 beach county, recounts, counted, 
county, in palm, the ballot, coun-
ties, fraud, in palm beach 
Table 2: Top features found for the US Presidential 
market. 
sourcefdate top ranked features 
Usenet meteorite, life, evidence, washing-
sci.space.news ton de august, martian meteorite, 
Aug 06, 1996 primitive, gibson, organic, of pos-
sible, martian, life on mars, david, 
life on, billion years ago, mckay 
Table 3: Top features found for the XLif market on 
the Foresight Exchange. 
7 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we explored the mechanism of informa­
tion incorporation in betting markets. We developed 
a theory based on simple efficiency assumptions that 
explains the increase in forecast accuracy over time ob­
served in real betting markets. We proposed a simple 
coin-flipping model of information flow into a market 
and demonstrated a qualitative correspondence with 
real data. We designed an algorithm for detecting in­
formation events in real markets and explaining them 
by extracting features from online text sources. In 
three case studies, our algorithm found key words and 
phrases subjectively very relevant to the events of the 
day corresponding to sharp market upswings or down­
swings. 
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